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INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATIONMADE INCOHERENT*
Proponents of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) claimthat our inferences should give explanatory considerations acentral role. Beyond this general agreement, however, they
have differed on precisely how explanation should inform inference. A
particular area of controversy has been the relation of IBE to Baye-
sianism. Should IBE be formulated in terms of full beliefs, as in tra-
ditional epistemology, or in terms of degrees of belief, as in Bayesian
epistemology? If it is formulated in the latter way, is it compatible with
Bayesian epistemology?
In this essay, I advance a new argument against non-Bayesian for-
mulations of IBE, which include both traditional formulations of IBE
in terms of full belief and non-Bayesian formulations of IBE in terms of
degrees of belief. I show that in some instances, IBE for full belief
licenses deductively inconsistent inferences from the same evidence.
In similar instances, following non-Bayesian IBE updating rules for
degrees of belief leads to probabilistically incoherent credences.
In section i, I present the problem for traditional formulations of
IBE in terms of full belief. In section ii, I present the problem for non-
Bayesian formulations of IBE in terms of degrees of belief. In section
iii, I consider some possible responses on behalf of the proponent of
these formulations. Finally, in section iv, I conclude with some re-
ﬂections on what a Bayesian form of IBE could look like.
i. ibe for full belief
Traditionally, proponents of IBE have formulated it in terms of full
belief or in terms of similar binary notions, such as acceptance. The
most common formulation of IBE is that suggested by the phrase
‘inference to the best explanation’: it is a procedure on which, if H is
the best explanation of one’s evidence, then one infers that H is true.
This formulation is endorsed by the following authors:
In making this inference [that is, in inferring to the best explanation]
one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the
evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be several
* I am grateful to Igor Douven, Daniel Immerman, Jonah Schupbach, and an
anonymous reviewer for this journal for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts. I
would also like to thank audience members at Notre Dame and Universidad de Los
Andes, especially Lane DesAutels and Mark Satta, for helpful feedback on presentations
of this project.
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hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to
reject all such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making
the inference. Thus one infers, from the premise that a given hypothesis
would provide a “better” explanation for the evidence than would any
other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true.1
Inference to the best explanation is the procedure of choosing the hy-
pothesis or theory that best explains the available data.2
IBE authorises the acceptance of a hypothesis H, on the basis that it is the
best explanation of the evidence.3
IBE can be written as follows: It is reasonable to believe that the best
available explanation of any fact is true.4
[In inference to the best explanation,] one concludes that something is
the case on the grounds that this best explains something else one be-
lieves to be the case.5
It is obvious that this form of IBE can lead to inconsistent conclu-
sions when applied multiple times to different items of evidence. For
example, one hypothesis may best explain evidence E1, whereas an
inconsistent hypothesis may best explain additional evidence E2. One
might have thought, however, that IBE cannot lead to inconsistent
conclusions when applied to the same evidence, so that we can avoid
inconsistency by only drawing inferences from our total evidence (for
example, E1&E2). Against this idea, I will now show that in some cases,
the above form of IBE can license inconsistent inferences from the
same evidence.
My argument is based on the following fact about human reasoning:
we offer and search for explanations at multiple levels. We can, with
equal propriety, explain the presence of a trait in a biological pop-
ulation by positing that its members possess a gene that has been
known to lead to that trait in similar organisms, or by telling a story
about how that trait helped the population’s ancestors survive and
reproduce. We can explain the invasion of one country by another by
appealing to the beliefs and desires of the politicians of the invading
1Gilbert Harman, “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” Philosophical Review,
lxxiv, 1 (January 1965): 88–95, at p. 89.
2 Jonathan Vogel, “Inference to the Best Explanation,” in Edward Craig, ed., Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).
3 Stathis Psillos, “Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism,” in F. Stadler,
ed., Induction and Deduction in the Sciences (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004), p. 83 (italics
omitted).
4 Alan Musgrave, “Experience and Perceptual Belief,” in Zuzana Parusnikova´ and
Robert S. Cohen, eds., Rethinking Popper (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), p. 17 (italics
omitted).
5 John Greco, “Inference to the Best Explanation,” in Robert Audi, ed., The Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, Third Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015),
p. 510.
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country, current geopolitical factors, or historical tensions between
the countries. Some explanations we offer or consider are more distal,
and some are more proximate; some are more local, and some are
more global. Despite their differences, all of these types of explana-
tions are generally recognized as legitimate, and they are all types that
we might be interested in inferring from the data available to us.
Although explanations at multiple levels of explanation may conﬂict,
they need not: the above explanations of the biological trait and na-
tional invasion could all be true.6
However, in cases where explanations at multiple levels are not
compatible, IBE can license inconsistent inferences from the same
data. Consider a case in which I tell you the following. I have four urns
with the following contents:
U1 5 4 white balls
U2 5 2 black balls, 2 white balls
U3 5 3 black balls, 1 white ball
U4 5 4 black balls
I am going to set one of these urns in front of you, and you are going
to draw a ball from it. I will select the urn by ﬂipping a coin twice. If it
lands heads the ﬁrst time, I will ﬂip it again to select between U1 and
U4. If it lands tails the ﬁrst time, I will ﬂip it again to select between U2
and U3.
In this case, we have the following two partitions of possibilities:7 {U1, U2,
U3, U4} and {Heads, Tails} (where the latter corresponds to the outcome
of the ﬁrst coin ﬂip). We also have the following material equivalencies:
Heads 5 U1_U4
Tails 5 U2_U3
Now suppose that I ﬂip the coin twice, and I set the chosen urn in
front of you. I do not tell you which urn is in front of you or the
outcome of the coin ﬂip. Your job is to infer that information by
sampling from the urn. Here there are two possibilities: {Black, White}.
You draw out a black ball. What should you conclude?
According to the simple version of IBE, you should infer the best
explanation of Black. What is that? If we are concerned with the ques-
tion of which urn is in front of you, then U4 is the best explanation, for
6 Peter Lipton makes a similar point in his Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed.
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 62–63, writing that in cases like those I have described,
“in spite of the suggestion of uniqueness that the word ‘best’ carries, Inference to the
Best Explanation should be construed so as to allow multiple explanations.”
7 A partition {H1, . . ., Hn} is a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
alternatives.
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that urn has only black balls andU4 does not start out as anymore or less
plausible than the other urn hypotheses. However, if we are concerned
with the question of whether I ﬂipped heads or tails, then Tails is the
better explanation. Tails makes it more likely that you would draw black
than does Heads, and neither Heads nor Tails is initially more or less
plausible than the other.
More formally, these judgments about explanation follow from this
principle about the conditions under which one hypothesis better
explains the evidence than another:
(1) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E, P(H1) 5 P(H2),
and P(EjH1) > P(EjH2), then H1 explains E better than H2.
What (1) says is that if two potential explanations of the evidence start
out equally credible and one makes the evidence more likely, then that
one explains the evidence better.
In the case at hand,
P(Heads) 5 P(Tails),
and
P(BlackjTails) 5 5/8 > P(BlackjHeads) 5 1/2.
Likewise,
P(U1) 5 P(U2) 5 P(U3) 5 P(U4) 5 1/4,
and
P(BlackjU4)5 1 > P(BlackjU3)5 3/4 > P(BlackjU2)51/2 > P(BlackjU1)5 0.
Hence, by (1), Tails explains Black better than does Heads, and U4
explains Black better than does U3 or U2. As such, the simplest form of
IBE would direct you to infer both U4 and Tails. However, U4 and Tails
are inconsistent. Therefore, following this form of IBE leads to de-
ductively inconsistent beliefs in this case.
Many proponents of IBE have offered more sophisticated versions of
the view as applied to full belief. For example, Theo Kuipers has defended
a version of IBE on which, given a set of candidate explanations {H1, . . .,
Hn} of E, one infers not that the best explanation of E among those is
true but that it is the closest of these hypotheses to the truth.8
8 Theo A. F. Kuipers, “Approaching the Truth with the Rule of Success,” Philosophia
Naturalis, xxi (1984): 244–53; Theo A. F. Kuipers, “Naı¨ve and Reﬁned Truth Approxi-
mation,” Synthese, xciii, 3 (December 1992): 299–341. See also Igor Douven, “Abduc-
tion,” in Edward N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011
Edition), URL 5 http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/,
section 2.
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Following this version of IBE will lead to inconsistent beliefs about
the closeness to truth of the hypotheses in the present case. Exactly
one of {Heads, Tails} is true, and exactly one of {U1, U2, U3, U4} is true.
Tails is closer to the truth than is Heads just in case Tails is true. If Tails
is true, then one of U2 or U3 is closer to the truth than U4, because one
of U2 or U3 is, simply, true. Hence, if one’s belief that Tails is closer to
the truth than Heads is true, then one’s belief that U4 is closer to the
truth than the other urn hypotheses is false. Conversely, if U4 is closer
to the truth than the other urn hypotheses, that is because it is, simply,
true; in this case, Heads is closer to the truth than is Tails, because
Heads is true and Tails is false.9
Other philosophers have argued that we should only infer the best
explanation when that explanation is satisfactory or good enough.10 Be-
cause of the imprecision of the notion of ‘good enough’, it is difﬁcult
to tell whether this version of IBE would license inference to both U4
and Tails in the above case. Suppose that it does not, however. It is
plausible that the requirement that H be a good enough explanation
of E will not rule out the above kind of scenario more generally unless
it always implies that, given E, H is more probable than not. (In the
above scenario, P(U4jBlack) 5 4/9.11 So U4 is less probable than not
even after you draw black. More generally, A and B can only be in-
consistent if one of them has a probability less than or equal to .5.)
Requiring that P(HjE) > .5, however, will not preclude inconsistent
beliefs in scenarios with more than two levels of explanations. To
demonstrate this, I will now describe a case with three levels of
9Most theories of closeness to the truth, including Kuipers’s in “Naı¨ve and Reﬁned
Truth Approximation,” op. cit., combine a “truth factor” with a “content factor.” (For an
overview of such theories, see Graham Oddie, “Truthlikeness,” in Edward N. Zalta, ed.,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), URL 5 http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/truthlikeness/.) Roughly speaking, the truth
factor measures how close a proposition comes to being true, whereas the content factor
measures how informative a proposition is. The idea in combining them is that we are
interested in how close a proposition is to the whole truth, and (other things equal)
informative propositions come closer to the whole truth than do uninformative prop-
ositions (such as tautologies). In the text, I focused solely on the truth factor because
Heads and Tails are equally informative and the urn hypotheses are equally informative.
As such, the only thing that makes a difference in how close each one is to the truth is how
close they are to being true—that is, the truth factor.
10 Alan Musgrave, “The Ultimate Argument for Scientiﬁc Realism,” in Robert Nola,
ed., Relativism and Realism in Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 229–52; Peter Lipton,
“VI*—Is the Best Good Enough?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, xciii, 1 (1993):
89–104; Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, op. cit., pp. 151–63. See also Douven,
“Abduction,” op. cit., section 2.
11 See the application of Bayes’s rule to the urn hypotheses in section ii for this
calculation.
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explanation, in which the best explanations at each level each have
posterior probability 2/3 and yet are jointly inconsistent.
A jury is deliberating about the killing of Mr. Boddy in the study with
the revolver. The jury is trying to answer three questions: (a) Who is
the killer? (b) What was the motive? (c) Was the killing planned? We
have the following three partitions corresponding to these questions:
{Plum, Green}, {Defense, Money}, and {Planned, ~Planned}. Let E be
the evidence that Boddy was killed with the revolver. Suppose that
(before learning E) the jury’s background knowledge imposes the
probability distribution on which P(Green&Money&~Planned&~E)5
P(Plum&Defense&~Planned&E) 5 P(Plum&Money&Planned&E) 5
P(Green&Defense&Planned&E) 5 1/4. Where each quadrant has
probability 1/4, this probability distribution can be represented as
follows:
So,
P(EjPlum) 5 P(EjDefense) 5 P(EjPlanned) 5 1
> P(EjGreen) 5 P(EjMoney) 5 P(Ej~Planned) 5 1/2,
P(Plum) 5 P(Green) 5 P(Defense) 5 P(Money) 5 P(Planned) 5
P(~Planned) 5 1/2,
P(PlumjE) 5 P(DefensejE) 5 P(PlannedjE) 5 2/3.
In other words, Plum (but not Green) would deﬁnitely use the revolver,
the killer would deﬁnitely use the revolver in self-defense (but might use
another weapon for money), and a premeditated homicide (but not a
spontaneous one) would deﬁnitely be committed with the revolver. But
Plum would not plan to kill someone in self-defense. (Green might, for
some reason—perhaps Green had an antecedent reason to believe that
Boddy was out to get him.) So in this case, that Plum did it, that it was in
self-defense, and that the killing was planned are all better explanations of
the killer using the revolver than are their rivals. In addition, all have
posterior probabilities above .5. Nevertheless, these explanations are
jointly inconsistent, and P(Plum&Defense&PlannedjE) 5 0.
If we raise the probabilistic threshold implied by “H is a good
enough explanation of E” above 2/3, then we can rule out the ex-
planations being good enough in the above case. But by adding in
further levels of explanation, we can devise a case of the above sort for
any threshold that falls short of 1. I conclude that adding to our
Green&Money&~Planned&~E Plum&Defense&~Planned&E
Plum&Money&Planned&E Green&Defense&Planned&E
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explanationist inference rule the requirement that H be a good
enough explanation of E will not preclude the same evidence from
warranting inconsistent inferences in some cases.12
ii. ibe for degrees of belief
In a series of essays, Igor Douven, Sylvia Wenmackers, and Jonah
Schupbach have explored a particular version of IBE, which I
will, following Douven and Wenmackers,13 call IBE*. IBE* is a non-
Bayesian updating rule that gives “bonus” points to more explanatory
hypotheses.
IBE* was ﬁrst discussed, albeit in a less precise form, by Bas van
Fraassen, who argued that an agent who follows IBE* will end up with
diachronically incoherent credences. Van Fraassen took this to show
that IBE and Bayesianism are incompatible.14 Although not endorsing
IBE* as the only reasonable explication of IBE, Douven15 subsequently
argued that this incompatibility does not refute IBE* as a legitimate
updating rule, contending that explanationists can adopt IBE* and
nevertheless defend themselves against van Fraassen’s diachronic
Dutch book argument as well as Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Petti-
grew’s16 inaccuracy-minimization argument. More recently, Douven,
Wenmackers, and Schupbach have argued that IBE* is more attractive
than Bayes’s rule in certain respects, including speed of convergence
to the truth,17 performance in a social setting,18 and accuracy as a
description of people’s actual probabilistic updating.19
12One might argue that cases with more than two levels of explanation are less
troubling inasmuch as the lottery and preface paradoxes already show that deductive
inconsistency is sometimes rationally permissible for larger sets of beliefs. I consider this
response in section III.4.
13 Igor Douven and Sylvia Wenmackers, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus
Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, lxviii, 2 (June
2017): 535–70.
14 Bas van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),
chapter 7, section 4.
15 Igor Douven, “Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent,” Philosophy of
Science, lxvi (September 1999): S424–35; Igor Douven, “Inference to the Best Expla-
nation, Dutch Books, and InaccuracyMinimisation,” The Philosophical Quarterly, lxiii, 252
(July 2013): 428–44.
16Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew, “An Objective Justiﬁcation of Bayesianism
II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy,” Philosophy of Science, lxxvii, 2 (April
2010): 236–72.
17 Douven, “Inference to the Best Explanation, Dutch Books, and Inaccuracy Mini-
misation,” op. cit.
18 Douven andWenmackers, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in
a Social Setting,” op. cit.
19 Igor Douven and Jonah N. Schupbach, “Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism:
The Case of Explanationism,” Frontiers in Psychology, vi (2015); Igor Douven and Jonah N.
Schupbach, “The Role of Explanatory Considerations in Updating,” Cognition, cxlii
(September 2015): 299–311.
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Douven’s defenses of IBE* focus on objections to IBE* that turn on
its leading to diachronically incoherent credences. In this section, I
show that in some cases, using IBE* to update on new evidence leads
to synchronic as well as diachronic incoherence. IBE* is thus not only
“non-Bayesian” in that it violates Bayesian conditionalization; it is non-
probabilist in that it violates the requirement that an agent’s credences
be probabilities. In addition, we will see that other non-Bayesian for-
mulations of IBE for degrees of beliefs, including ones suggested by
Douven as alternatives to IBE*,20 have this same consequence.
To see how IBE* works, consider updating your credences about my
coin ﬂip in the original urn case. We have the following possibilities:
U1 5 4 white balls
U2 5 2 black balls, 2 white balls
U3 5 3 black balls, 1 white ball
U4 5 4 black balls
Heads 5 U1_U4
Tails 5 U2_U3
You have drawn a black ball from the urn. What should your new
credence that tails was ﬂipped be?
According to Bayes’s rule (also called Bayesian conditionalization),21
where Cr(Tails) is your original credence that the coin landed tails
and Crnew(Tails) is your credence that it landed tails after updating,22
CrnewðTailsÞ5CrðTailsjBlackÞ
5
CrðTailsÞCrðBlack j TailsÞ
CrðTailsÞCrðBlack j TailsÞ1Crð~TailsÞCrðBlack j ~TailsÞ
5

1
2

5
8


1
2

5
8

1

1
2

1
2
5
5
16
5
16
1
1
4
5
5
16
9
16
5
5
9
» :56
More generally, where {H1, . . ., Hn} is a partition of hypotheses, Bayes’s
rule says that
20 Igor Douven, “Inference to the Best Explanation: What Is It? And Why Should We
Care?,” in Ted Poston and Kevin McCain, eds., Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to
the Best Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), chapter 2.
21 I follow Douven in using the term “Bayes’s rule,” but stress that this rule should not
be confused with Bayes’s theorem. The latter is a theorem of the probability calculus and
is not (or should not be) controversial. It is the second equality below, which expresses
P(HeadsjBlack) as a function of P(Heads), P(BlackjHeads), and P(Blackj~Heads). The
former is a philosophically controversial claim that says that an agent’s credence in H
after getting evidence E should be equal to her former credence in H conditional on E.
22 I switch from P(.) to Cr(.) here because I will be discussing some credence functions
that are probabilistically incoherent and hence are not probability functions.
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CrnewðHiÞ5CrðHi j EÞ5 CrðHiÞCrðE j HiÞ
+j

Cr

Hj

Cr

E j Hj

According to IBE*, by contrast,
CrnewðHiÞ5 CrðHiÞCrðE j HiÞ1 f ðHi ;EÞ
+j

Cr

Hj

Cr

E j Hj

1 f

Hj ;E

f(Hi, E) is a function that assigns a non-negative bonus b to the hy-
pothesis Hi that best explains the evidence, and 0 to all other hy-
potheses. (IBE* and Bayes’s rule are equivalent just in case this bonus
is 0.) If we set the bonus b to 1/8, then, given that Tails explains
drawing black better than does Heads, IBE* would calculate your new
credence in the present case as follows:
CrnewðTailsÞ5
CrðTailsÞCrðBlack j TailsÞ1 1
8
CrðTailsÞCrðBlack j TailsÞ1CrðHeadsÞCrðBlack j HeadsÞ1 1
8
5
5
16
1
2
16
9
16
1
2
16
5
7
11
» :64
A parallel calculation for Crnew(Heads) would ﬁnd that it is equal to
4/11, or approximately .36.
What about the urn hypotheses? According to Bayes’s rule, your new
credence in U4 is:
CrnewðU4Þ5 CrðU4ÞCrðBlack j U4Þ+i ½CrðUiÞCrð Black j UiÞ
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1
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5
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16
5
4
9
» :44
Similar calculations would show that Crnew(Heads) 5 4/9, Crnew(U1) 5 0,
Crnew(U2) 5 2/9, and Crnew(U3) 5 3/9. Note that given Black, Tails
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(5U2_U3) and U4 are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and
so your credences in them rightly sum to 1.
However, according to IBE*, given that U4 is the best urn-
explanation of your draw, and setting b at 1/8,23
CrnewðU4Þ5 CrðU4ÞCrð Black j U4Þ1 f ðU4;BlackÞ+i ½CrðUiÞCrðBlack j UiÞ1 f ðUi ;BlackÞ
5
4
16
1
2
16
9
16
1
2
16
5
6
11
» :55
Similar calculations show that Crnew(U1)5 0, Crnew(U2)5 2/11, and
Crnew(U3) 5 3/11.
The problem is now easy to see. You know that Heads is true iff U4 is.
However, you assign them different credences: you are more conﬁ-
dent than not that the fourth urn was picked but less conﬁdent than
not that heads was ﬂipped. This is probabilistically incoherent.24
So far I have only considered IBE* as a non-Bayesian version of IBE
for degrees of belief. In his most recent essay on IBE,25 Douven con-
siders a more general schema of non-Bayesian forms of IBE of which
IBE* is a special case:
CrnewðHiÞ5 CrðHiÞCrðE j HiÞ1 c ×CrðHiÞCrðE j HiÞmðHi ;EÞ
+j

Cr

Hj

Cr

E j Hj

1 c ×Cr

Hj

Cr

E j Hj

m

Hj ;E

Here c 2 [0, 1] is a constant and m 2 [-1, 1] is a formal measure of how
well Hi explains E. The main difference between this schema and the
more speciﬁc IBE* is that this schema assigns explanatory bonuses and
penalties to all hypotheses, whereas IBE* only assigns a bonus to the
23 Any non-zero bonus will result in incoherence for the same reason. I choose 1/8 for
ease of computation.
24 IBE* will also lead to incoherence in the Mr. Boddy case. If Plum, Defense, and
Planned all receive an explanatory bonus, then Crnew(Plum) > 2/3, Crnew(Defense) >
2/3, and Crnew(Planned) > 2/3. Suppose the jury’s new credences are coherent. Then:
Crnew(Plum&Money&Planned)1 Crnew(Plum&Defense&~Planned)5 Crnew(Plum)
> 2/3,
Crnew(Plum&Defense&~Planned)1 Crnew(Green&Defense&Planned)5 Crnew(Defense)
> 2/3,
and
Crnew(Plum&Money&Planned) 1 Crnew(Green&Defense&Planned) 5 Crnew(Planned)
> 2/3.
But this implies that
Crnew(Plum&Money&Planned) 1 Crnew(Plum&Defense&~Planned) 1
Crnew(Green&Defense&Planned) > 1,
which is incoherent. So the jury’s new credences cannot be coherent.
25 Douven, “Inference to the Best Explanation: What Is It? And Why Should We
Care?,” op. cit.
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most explanatory hypothesis. The constant c determines how much
weight is given to explanatory considerations compared to the weight
carried by the priors and likelihoods; a higher value gives explanatory
considerations greater weight.
In our urn case, this general schema will lead to incoherent results
given that c > 0, m(Heads, Black) < m(Tails, Black), m(U2, Black) <
m(U4, Black), and m(U3, Black) < m(U4, Black)—that is, given that
some extra weight is given to explanatory considerations, and given that
Tails is counted as a better explanation than Heads and U4 is counted
as a better explanation than U2 or U3. To see this, note that
Crnew(Heads) 5 Crnew(U4) 5 4/9 if c 5 0 (in which case this rule
reduces to Bayes’s rule). If c > 0, then the new credence in Tails will be
lower, because Tails gets a lower explanatory bonus than Heads, and
so after normalizing (by dividing by the denominator) so that
Crnew(Heads)1 Crnew(Tails)5 1, Crnew(Heads) < 4/9. Likewise, the new
credence inU4 will be higher, becauseU4 gets a bigger explanatory bonus
than U2 and U3; hence, Crnew(U4) > 4/9. But this is probabilistically
incoherent, becauseHeads andU4 are equivalent after drawing black and
so must have equal probabilities. Thus, we can only avoid incoherence by
setting c equal to 0, which reduces this schema to Bayes’s rule.
Setting aside the particular schema above, the general problem that
I have identiﬁed will remain for any credence update rule that gives
“bonuses” to explanatorily better hypotheses. Any ranking of explan-
atory goodness that satisﬁes (1) will sometimes rank hypotheses at
different levels of explanation in ways that lead to inconsistency if
explanatory hypotheses get bonuses beyond those already given by
likelihoods. This is because the hypothesis ranked best at one level of
explanation will not necessarily be consistent with the hypothesis
ranked best at another level of explanation.
iii. responses26
I have argued that when we are considering potential explanations of
the available evidence at multiple levels, following non-Bayesian ver-
sions of IBE can lead to either deductive inconsistency or probabilistic
incoherence. In this section, I want to consider four responses on
behalf of the defender of these versions of IBE. The ﬁrst response is to
deny my claims about which explanations are better in the cases I have
described. The second response is that we should not infer or update
beliefs or credences in atomic hypotheses of the kind I have consid-
ered here but rather in complete world-states. The third response is
that the kind of situation I have described is not widespread enough
for my argument to undermine most applications of IBE. The fourth
26 This section beneﬁted greatly from the comments of an anonymous reviewer.
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response is to give up deductive consistency and probabilistic co-
herence as rational requirements on beliefs and credences.
III.1. Denying (1). The most straightforward objection to my initial
urn case is that I was wrong to assume that U4 is a better explanation of
Black than U2 or U3 or that Tails is a better explanation of Black than
Heads. (Analogous remarks go for the Mr. Boddy case; I will focus on
the urn case in what follows.) All I have shown, so the objection goes, is
that one of these claims about explanatory goodness must be false. I
noted in section i that these claims about explanatory goodness follow
from
(1) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E, P(H1) 5 P(H2),
and P(EjH1) > P(EjH2), then H1 explains E better than H2.
The defender of this ﬁrst objection must thus deny (1).
In the course of defending the descriptive adequacy of IBE*,
Douven and Schupbach27 consider formalizations of the notion of
explanatory goodness employed in IBE* in terms of several proposed
probabilistic measures of explanatory power.28 All of these measures
imply that
(2) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E, P(H1) 5 P(H2),
and P(EjH1) > P(EjH2), then H1 is a more powerful explanation of E
than H2.
In fact, they all imply something stronger than (2), namely that
(3) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E and P(EjH1) > P
(EjH2), then H1 is a more powerful explanation of E than H2.29
If explanatory goodness 5 explanatory power, then (1) and (2) are
equivalent. Hence, if we formalize explanatory goodness in terms of
one of the proposed measures of explanatory power in the literature,
then we must accept (1). We must also accept the stronger claim that
(4) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E and P(EjH1) > P
(EjH2), then H1 explains E better than H2.
27 Douven and Schupbach, “Probabilistic Alternatives to Bayesianism,” op. cit., pp. 3–4.
28 See, for example, Jonah N. Schupbach, “Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Ex-
planatory Power,” Philosophy of Science, lxxviii, 5 (December 2011): 813–29; Jonah N.
Schupbach and Jan Sprenger, “The Logic of Explanatory Power,” Philosophy of Science,
lxxviii, 1 (January 2011): 105–27; Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori, “A Second Look
at the Logic of Explanatory Power (with Two Novel Representation Theorems),” Phi-
losophy of Science, lxxix, 3 (July 2012): 365–85.
29 In fact, most discussions of these measures take for granted even stronger axioms
than (3) as conditions of adequacy for a measure of explanatory power.
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But one might hold that there are other explanatory virtues besides
explanatory power, such as informativeness and fruitfulness. There-
fore, H1 might be a more powerful explanation of E than H2 and yet
still be a worse overall explanation.30
However, even if one thought that (1) might be false in cases where,
say, H2 was more informative or fruitful than H1, the urn case is not
such a case. The different coin hypotheses and the different urn hy-
potheses are symmetrical: not only do they have equal prior proba-
bilities, they are the same kinds of hypotheses, about the same kinds of
objects, saying the same kinds of things. None are ad hoc. All appear to
be equally informative, fruitful, and so on. There seem to be no sub-
stantive differences among them except for the degree to which they
predict the evidence. In such a case, it is very difﬁcult to deny that the
hypothesis that predicts the evidence more strongly is the better ex-
planation of that evidence. Rejecting the above judgments about
which explanations are better is thus not an attractive option.
I should note that, although they do not consider examples like
those above, Douven and Wenmackers do attempt to preclude the
possibility of cases in which IBE* leads to probabilistic incoherence by
making a formal assumption about the explanatory bonus function
f(H, E):
[I]t is safe to assume that, for all E, f(H, E)5 0 whenever H is a tautology
or a contradiction. If we make the further formal assumption that, for all
E, f(H_H*, E) 5 f(H, E) 1 f(H*, E) whenever H and H* are mutually
exclusive, then it is easy to prove that updating a probability function via
IBE* leads again to a probability function.31
The urn example violates this second assumption. Your background
knowledge implies that Heads is materially equivalent to U1_U4. But
f(Heads, Black) 5 0  f(U1, Black) 1 f(U4, Black) 5 0 1 1 5 1.
30My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
31 Douven andWenmackers, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in
a Social Setting,” op. cit., section 2. As stated, these two assumptions are inconsistent. By
the ﬁrst assumption, f(H_~H, E) 5 0. But by the second assumption, f(H_~H, E) 5
f(H, E) 1 f(~H, E). But if f(H, E) is non-zero, then these two equalities are inconsistent.
In correspondence, Douven has suggested that he and Wenmackers should have added
the condition that H and H* are not jointly exhaustive. Alternatively, they could limit the
ﬁrst assumption to contradictions alone (because applying IBE* will make Crnew(H)
equal to 1 for any value of f, if Cr(H) 5 1). Both of these ﬁxes have odd
consequences—the latter assigns an “explanatory bonus” (albeit a vacuous one) to
tautologies, and the formermakes f discontinuous in the limit. But because they make no
practical difference to credence assignments, neither of these problems seem as serious
to me as the inconsistency of the second assumption with our explanatory judgments in
the urn case.
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Because, as I have argued, it is clear that U4 is the best explanation
among the urn hypotheses and Tails is the best explanation among the
coin hypotheses, it follows that the second assumption above is not a
tenable constraint on f if f is a function that assigns a bonus to the best
explanation of the evidence.
III.2. World-States. The above inconsistency arose because we were
considering two different partitions of hypotheses, at different levels of
explanation. If we could ensure that we only consider one partition,
then there would be no room for a conﬂict to arise. The easiest way to
do this would be to have an agent directly update her
beliefs/credences over the partition of complete world-states by IBE,
with her new beliefs/credences over world-states imposing
beliefs/credences over other partitions. Here a world-state is a con-
junction such that, for every atomic partition of possibilities in an
agent’s language explanatorily prior to the observed evidence, the
world-state contains one member of each partition as a conjunct. For
example, in the original urn scenario, if the atomic partitions prior to
the observed evidence Black are {Heads, Tails} and {U1, U2, U3, U4},
then there are four world-states consistent with your background
knowledge:
{Heads&U1, Heads&U4, Tails&U2, Tails&U3}.
It follows from (4) that Heads&U4 is the best explanation of Black
among these hypotheses. If you are fully inferring to the best expla-
nation, then the current proposal would have you infer that
Heads&U4 is true. You will then believe each of these conjuncts in-
dividually as well. If you are updating your credences, then Heads&U4
will receive the explanatory boost among the members of this parti-
tion. Your other new credences could then be determined by your new
credence distribution over this partition, as in a standard probability
function: any sentence in an agent’s language is equivalent to a dis-
junction of world-states, and so its probability can be determined by
adding the probabilities assigned to those world-states.
I have three objections to this strategy for resolving the problem.32
The ﬁrst is that it is impossible to apply in actual reasoning. Outside of
idealized thought experiments such as those under discussion here, an
agent could not even formulate a world-state, let alone assign a
32 In section 2 of my manuscript, “The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities” (un-
published), I discuss some additional problems with taking world-states to be the primary
objects of inference. (My deﬁnition of world-states there differs from that in this paper in
that I do not require that the partitions be explanatorily prior to the evidence, but most
of the same points apply.)
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probability to it. In real life, we rarely consider partitions of complex
conjunctions of multiple hypotheses; we instead consider partitions of
different atomic or near-atomic propositions.
A second problem for this response is that a maximally speciﬁc
description of the world is not the kind of thing that we tend to con-
sider a good explanation. Usually when we ask what explains some
observed evidence, we are interested in much more speciﬁc hypoth-
eses and not in a complete history of the universe. Applying IBE only
to world-states is thus in tension with the spirit of IBE, which is usually
understood to license inference to these much more speciﬁc
explanations.
Applying IBE only to world-states is in tension with the spirit of IBE
for another reason. The core intuition behind IBE is that how well
hypotheses explain the evidence is important for determining whether
those hypotheses are true. However, inferring/boosting our credence
in the world-state that best explains one’s evidence privileges the ex-
planatory relations between world-states and the evidence at the ex-
pense of the explanatory relations between atomic propositions and
the evidence and the explanatory relations among the atomic prop-
ositions themselves. If the fact that Heads&U4 is the best explanation
of Black among {Heads&U1, Heads&U4, Tails&U2, Tails&U3} gives us
reason to infer/boost our credence in Heads&U4, then it seems that
the fact that Tails is the best explanation of Black among {Heads, Tails}
should also give us reason to infer/boost our credence in Tails. But
non-Bayesian versions of IBE cannot accept both of these claims. It
would be preferable to have a version of IBE that can take into account
the explanatory goodness of all hypotheses, not just that of world-
states.
III.3. Limiting IBE. In his most recent essay on IBE, Douven writes
that IBE is best thought of as a “slogan,” the correct spelling out of
which depends on the situation. Another response that the defender
of IBE* and IBE for full belief could make would be to grant their
inapplicability in the kind of case that I have discussed but to hold that
they can still be applied in other cases—that in other cases, they are
the best way to spell out the slogan of IBE.33 A fairly limited restriction
would be to hold that these forms of IBE can be applied when no
hypotheses at different levels of explanation are inconsistent with each
other, as Tails is inconsistent with U4.
To see whether this restriction works, let us consider a revision of
the original urn case. Now, if I ﬂip heads the ﬁrst time, instead of there
33 For example, one might support this claim about IBE* with the alleged advantages
of IBE* discussed in the texts referenced at the beginning of section ii.
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being a probability of 0 of selecting U2 or U3, I will initiate a chance
process that has a 1/100 probability of selecting U2 and a 1/100
probability of selecting U3, and that distributes the remaining proba-
bility equally among U1 and U4. Similarly, if I ﬂip tails, I will initiate a
process that has a 1/100 probability of selecting U1 and a 1/100
probability of selecting U4, and that distributes the remaining proba-
bility equally among U2 and U3.
Let us ﬁrst consider how problematic it is to follow IBE for full belief
in this case. It still follows from (1) that Tails is the best coin explanation
of drawing black, and U4 is the best urn-explanation. Because Tails and
U4 are now logically consistent, inferring both of themdoes not give one
deductively inconsistent beliefs. Nevertheless, Tails and U4 are ex-
tremely negatively relevant to each other. Even though neither is very
initially unlikely on its own, the prior chance that both are true is only
1/200. That both are true is thus a surprising claim to be committed to
by one’s inferring to the best explanation of drawing black.
Moreover, the reason that Tails is the best coin explanation of Black
is in signiﬁcant tension with U4. Tails is the best explanation of Black
because it makes it more likely that U2_U3, which makes Black more
likely than U1_U4. It would be very odd to infer that U4 because it
explains Black well and to also infer that Tails is true because it ex-
plains Black well by making likely hypotheses that one is rejecting in inferring
U4. As with the world-state revision considered above, inferring both of
these would ignore the negative explanatory relation that Tails and
U4 bear toward each other in favor of the positive explanatory rela-
tions that they individually bear toward Black.
Finally, inferring the best explanation in this but not in the original
urn case would commit us to a problematic discontinuity as we move
from extreme negative relevance to logical inconsistency. In-
consistency is a limiting case of negative relevance, and it seems bad to
allow the inference of two propositions as they become more and
more negatively relevant to each other but to disallow it as soon as they
reach the point of inconsistency.
As for IBE*, it still leads to incoherence. In this case, we have the
following hypotheses and (initial) credences:
U1 5 the urn selected contains 4 white balls
U2 5 the urn selected contains 2 black balls, 2 white balls
U3 5 the urn selected contains 3 black balls, 1 white ball
U4 5 the urn selected contains 4 black balls
Cr(U1jHeads) 5 Cr(U4jHeads) 5 49/100
Cr(U2jHeads) 5 Cr(U3jHeads) 5 1/100
Cr(U1jTails) 5 Cr(U4jTails) 5 1/100
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Cr(U2jTails) 5 Cr(U3jTails) 5 49/100
Cr(BlackjHeads) 5 Cr(U1jHeads)Cr(BlackjU1) 1 Cr(U2jHeads)
Cr(BlackjU2) 1 Cr(U3jHeads)Cr(BlackjU3) 1 Cr(U4jHeads)
Cr(BlackjU4) 5 (49/100)(0)1 (1/100)(1/2)1 (1/100)(3/4)1 (49/100)
(1) 5 1/200 1 3/400 1 49/100 5 201/400 5 .5025
Cr(BlackjTails) 5 Cr(U1jTails)Cr(BlackjU1) 1 Cr(U2jTails)
Cr(BlackjU2) 1 Cr(U3jTails)Cr(BlackjU3)1 Cr(U4jTails)Cr(BlackjU4)5
(1/100)(0) 1 (49/100)(1/2) 1 (49/100)(3/4) 1 (1/100)(1) 5 49/200 1
147/400 1 1/100 5 249/400 5 .6225
As noted above, it still follows from (1) that Tails is the best coin-
explanation of drawing black, and U4 is the best urn-explanation. If we
consider the set of world-states {Heads&U1, Heads&U2, Heads&U3,
Heads&U4, Tails&U1, Tails&U2, Tails&U3, Tails&U4}, it follows from (4) that
Heads&U4 and Tails&U4 are better explanations of Black than are any of
the other world-states. If we identify explanatory goodness with explanatory
power, it will also follow from any of the measures of explanatory power
mentioned earlier that Heads&U4 and Tails&U4 are equally good expla-
nations, because they make the evidence equally probable. In such a case,
Douven and Wenmackers say that Heads&U4 and Tails&U4 should split
the explanatory bonus b equally, so that f(H&U4,B)5 f(T&U4,B)5 b/2.34
It then follows from IBE* that
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34 Douven andWenmackers, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in
a Social Setting,” op. cit., section 2.
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If your new credence distribution is coherent, then Crnew(Heads) 5
Crnew(Heads&U1) 1 Crnew(Heads&U2) 1 Crnew(Heads&U3) 1
Crnew(Heads&U4). However,
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iff b5 0. As such, your new credence distribution is coherent iff b5 0,
in which case IBE* reduces to Bayes’s rule. Therefore, applying IBE*
with a non-zero explanatory bonus in this new case still leads to
incoherence.
Douven’s more general schema will also lead to incoherence. It will
give an explanatory penalty to Heads, thus lowering Crnew(Heads).
However, it will give equal penalties/bonuses to Heads&U2 and
Tails&U2, Heads&U3 and Tails&U3, and Heads&U4 and Tails&U4,
respectively. (Crnew(Heads&U1) 5 Crnew(Tails&U1) 5 0 no matter
what.) This will increase the sum
Crnew(Heads&U1) 1 Crnew(Heads&U2) 1 Crnew(Heads&U3) 1
Crnew(Heads&U4).
This is because, without the bonus b, this sum is less than the sum
Crnew(Tails&U1)1 Crnew(Tails&U2)1 Crnew(Tails&U3)1 Crnew(Tails&U4),
and adding the same quantity to two values makes their ratio closer to
equal, thus making the normalized sum of the former credences
higher. Therefore,
Crnew(Heads) > Crnew(Heads&U1)1 Crnew(Heads&U2)1 Crnew(Heads&U3)1
Crnew(Heads&U4),
which is incoherent.
Applying non-Bayesian forms of IBE remains problematic, then,
even when two best explanations at different levels of explanation are
merely negatively relevant to each other and not inconsistent. So, if we
are to apply these forms of IBE only to unproblematic cases, then we
must limit their application to cases in which we are either not in-
terested in multiple levels of explanation or in which the best expla-
nations at different levels are not negatively relevant to each other.
Although I do not think that my argument in this paper deﬁnitively
rules out the viability of such a restriction, I do want to suggest two
reasons to be wary of it. First, it would be preferable, all other things
equal, to have a uniﬁed inference form that we can use in all or most
contexts. If we think that this inference form will be a version of IBE,
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then we should prefer a Bayesian explication of IBE (such as the one
gestured at in section iv) that does not lead to inconsistency or in-
coherence in any cases.
Second, the above restricted forms of IBE could arguably only rarely
be applied, inasmuch as the phenomenon of reasoning about multiple
levels of explanation is quite common. Although the urn case is clearly
a toy example, the Mr. Boddy example is fairly realistic (aside from the
board game references). The jury on a normal homicide case really
will be interested not only in the question of who the killer is but also
in the circumstances surrounding the killing, such as the killer’s
motives, which is a level of explanation up from the question of who
the killer is. This information is important because a revenge killing,
but not a self-defense killing, would constitute murder. In addition, if
the killing does constitute murder, then the jury needs to know how
severe a sentence the circumstances warrant, and so they need to
determine whether the murder was premeditated.
As another example, imagine a doctor observing particular symp-
toms, such as headaches and chest pain, in a patient. He considers
certain physiological conditions that might cause these symptoms,
such as high blood pressure and bronchitis. He further considers
certain behavioral patterns that are likely to have caused these con-
ditions, such as poor diet and smoking cigarettes. It is important that
he determine the correct explanation at both of these levels so as to
best judge how to treat the condition that the patient is most likely to
have.
Reasoning about multiple levels of explanation, then, is a familiar
feature of ordinary life.35 One might still think that only rarely will the
best explanations at different levels be negatively relevant to each
other, so that we can still apply the above forms of IBE in most cases of
reasoning about multiple levels of explanation. This claim is difﬁcult
to assess from the armchair. But even if in many cases the best
35 The kind of complexity present in multiple levels of explanation is really a speciﬁc
form of the more general Quinean phenomenon in which all of our beliefs are con-
nected. Formal epistemologists have largely neglected this phenomenon, perhaps be-
cause of the difﬁculty of formally representing it. In my own view, the best formal
representation of this interconnectedness is found in the theory of Bayesian networks, as
developed by Judea Pearl in his Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems (SanMateo, CA:
Morgan Kaufmann, 1988). Bayesian networks have been applied to epistemology in Luc
Bovens and Stephan Hartmann’s Bayesian Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003); Leah Henderson et al.’s “The Structure and Dynamics of Scientiﬁc Theories: A
Hierarchical Bayesian Perspective,” Philosophy of Science, lxxvii, 2 (April 2010): 172–200;
and in my “The Structure of Epistemic Probabilities,” op. cit. These texts all contain
further examples of empirical and scientiﬁc reasoning that is concerned with more than
one level of explanation.
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explanations at multiple levels will not be negatively relevant to each
other, we will often not be able to know this fact in advance of in-
vestigation. For example, we can imagine that as the doctor learns
more, he comes to conclude that the best physiological explanation of
the patient’s headache is high blood pressure, and the best behavioral
explanation of high blood pressure is smoking, but smoking is not the
best behavioral explanation of the patient’s headache. Inasmuch as we
usually cannot rule out such a situation in advance, we should be wary
of using a rule that will run into trouble in such a situation.
III.4. Giving Up Consistency/Coherence. I have argued that following
non-Bayesian forms of IBE sometimes leads either to deductive in-
consistency, in the case of IBE for full belief, or probabilistic in-
coherence, in the case of non-Bayesian versions of IBE for degrees of
belief. However, I have not yet said much about why this is a negative
consequence.
Consider probabilistic incoherence ﬁrst. Philosophers disagree
about whether rational credences must be diachronically coherent.
However, most philosophers who work on the subject agree that ra-
tional credences must be synchronically coherent. The reasons for this
belief perhaps differ from philosopher to philosopher (see section iv
for one basis for synchronic coherence that does not extend to dia-
chronic coherence). This is not the place to rehearse the various
justiﬁcations commonly given for probabilistic coherence. It is enough
to note that IBE* has so far been explored in contexts that take for
granted the need for synchronic coherence. The papers by Douven,
Schupbach, and Wenmackers cited at the beginning of section ii all
assume that credences updated by IBE* will be probabilities, and their
discussions tend to take for granted that this is a condition of an
adequate update rule. For example, Douven and Wenmackers write
that “we will want an update rule to be formally adequate, at least in
that it outputs a probability function when given a probability function
as input.”36 Thus, the argument of this paper shows that IBE* does not
satisfy one of the criteria of adequacy assumed in most discussions of
what form a credal version of IBE should take. Dialectically, then, it
shows that IBE* is not the right way to spell out the slogan of IBE.
Consider deductive consistency next. It is more common for phi-
losophers to give up this requirement in light of apparent counter-
examples. Many philosophers have argued that because of the preface
and lottery paradoxes, anyone who thinks that it is sometimes rational
to believe propositions that are less than fully certain must accept that
36 Douven andWenmackers, “Inference to the Best Explanation versus Bayes’s Rule in
a Social Setting,” op. cit., section 2.
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it is sometimes rational to believe propositions that are jointly in-
consistent.37 In light of this argument, one might take my argument to
simply give us another reason to give up deductive consistency as a
requirement for rational belief.
In response, I would like to make two points. First, my argument may
still be effective for philosophers who believe that the preface and
lottery paradoxes can be resolved in such a way as to not give up on
deductive consistency as a requirement for full beliefs. These philos-
ophers should agree that the fact that following the above versions of
IBE sometimes leads to inconsistent beliefs gives us reason to reject
these versions of IBE.38
Second, even if we can rationally have a large inconsistent set of
beliefs, it remains plausible that it is never rational to believe two
propositions that are inconsistent with each other. For example,
Easwaran and Fitelson write that “smaller inconsistent belief sets seem
‘less coherent’ than larger inconsistent belief sets.”39 Only for in-
consistent sets of size 2 do they think it completely clear that rationality
precludes belief in all the members of the set. Therefore, if we are to
retain IBE for full belief by giving up on consistency, we should ar-
guably adopt a version of IBE on which, in order for an explanation to
count as good enough to infer, it must have a probability of at least .5.
37 See, for example, David Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004); Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson, “Accuracy, Coherence,
and Evidence,” in Tamar Szabo´ Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in
Epistemology, vol. 5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 61–96.
38One might reply that we could borrow from these philosophers’ resolutions of the
preface and lottery paradoxes to add a requirement to IBE for full belief that would rule
out the kinds of inferences I discussed. For instance, if these philosophers think you
should not hold lottery beliefs because they have property X, and the IBE-based beliefs
in my cases have property X, then we can add to IBE the requirement that one not infer a
conclusion that has property X. Although I cannot consider all of the resolutions of the
lottery and preface paradoxes that have been proposed here, I will note that at least
some will not extend to my cases. For example, Dana Nelkin tries to maintain deductive
consistency in the face of the lottery paradox by arguing that rational belief cannot be
based on purely statistical evidence, as one’s belief that one will lose a fair lottery is if one
bases it purely on the number of tickets in the lottery (“The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge,
and Rationality,” Philosophical Review, cix, 3 (July 2000): 373–409). Rather, rational belief
requires that one see an apparent “causal or explanatory connection between [one’s]
belief and the fact that makes it true” (ibid., p. 396). However, beliefs based on inference
to the best explanation are the paradigm cases in which there is an apparent causal or
explanatory connection between one’s belief and the fact that makes it true. For in-
stance, if you infer that U4 because you drew a black ball out of the urn and U4 posits the
greatest number of black balls in the urn, then your belief is based on evidence that U4, if
true, helped make true. Likewise, if the jury infers that Plum is guilty because Boddy was
killed with the revolver and Plum was more likely to use the revolver than Green was,
their belief is based on evidence that Plum’s being the murderer made true, if Plum is
the murderer.
39 Easwaran and Fitelson, “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence,” op. cit., pp. 83–84.
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This narrows down the versions of IBE to which my argument ap-
plies, but it is still an interesting result that we should reject versions of
IBE for full belief that do not include or imply this threshold re-
quirement. In addition, inasmuch as the argument of section ii shows
that the relevant probabilities for this requirement must be de-
termined in a traditional Bayesian way40 rather than according to IBE*
or some other non-Bayesian updating rule, this form of IBE will be, in
some sense, a Bayesian version of IBE. My argument will then work
against versions of IBE that are not Bayesian in this sense.
iv. conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that non-Bayesian forms of IBE sometimes
lead either to deductive inconsistency, in the case of IBE for full belief,
or probabilistic incoherence, in the case of versions of IBE for degrees
of belief that use non-Bayesian updating rules. They do so in situations
where we are concerned with multiple levels of explanation, and the
best explanations at different levels conﬂict with each other. Inasmuch
as this phenomenon is both common and problematic, we should
reject these forms of IBE as general rules for inference or updating.
In spite of these arguments, I endorse the claim that explanatory
considerations are central to good inference. Having argued against
non-Bayesian forms of IBE, in this last section, I want to brieﬂy con-
sider how explanatory factors could inform inference within a Bayes-
ian framework.
First, note that even if we conclude from the above that we must
reject any form of IBE that is inconsistent with Bayesian con-
ditionalization, explanatory considerations could still be relevant to
conﬁrmation inasmuch as, frequently,
P(HjE&[there is an explanatory connection between E and H]) >
P(HjE&[there is no explanatory connection between E and H]).41
But in fact I do not think the above arguments show that we should
reject any form of IBE that is inconsistent with Bayesian con-
ditionalization. There are already good reasons to reject Bayes’s rule as
a universal updating rule. As philosophers have long argued,42 there
40 But see section iv, where I suggest that explanatory factors do play a role in de-
termining these probabilities, just not the kind of role embodied in a non-Bayesian
updating rule.
41 I argue for this claim in my “How Explanation Guides Conﬁrmation,” Philosophy of
Science, lxxxiv, 2 (April 2017): 359–68, against William Roche and Elliot Sober,
“Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Irrelevant, or Inference to the Best Explanation Meets
Bayesian Conﬁrmation Theory,” Analysis, lxxiii, 4 (October 2013): 659–68.
42 For example, Fahiem Bacchus, Henry E. Kyburg Jr., and Mariam Thalos, “Against
Conditionalization,” Synthese, lxxxv, 3 (December 1990): 475–506.
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are many cases in which it is clear that we should not update by con-
ditionalization, such as when we start out with (what we now recognize
to be) irrational credences.
I endorse the traditional Bayesian objection to formulations of IBE
for full belief that they do not take into account degrees of conﬁdence
or degrees of conﬁrmation. However, given the above problems with
conditionalization, my objection to IBE* is not the obvious Bayesian
one that it violates conditionalization. Rather, I think that in a sense,
IBE* does not go far enough. IBE* (and the more general schema
considered in section ii) replaces a rule that is a complete function of
one’s prior credence distribution with one that is a partial function of
one’s prior credence distribution. Standard Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion “inherits” the coherence of your past credence state: it keeps your
credences in propositions at different levels of explanation coherent
by preserving the coherent relations between them in your past cre-
dence function. By distorting these relations, IBE* leads to probabi-
listic incoherence. But making your current credences a function of
your past credences is not the only way to get probabilistic coherence.
Another way is to make them a function of the objective epistemic
probabilities.
Hence, in rejecting Bayes’s rule, I think we should go further than
IBE*. We should give up on the idea that one’s current credences are
in any way beholden to one’s past credences, and so give up on rules
for updating altogether. If you start out with irrational credences, no
update rule will save you. You should base your current credence in H,
not on the idiosyncratic opinions of your past self about H, but on the
objective epistemic probability of H given your evidence. And, as
Jonathan Weisberg argues,43 it is here that explanatory factors can play
an important role—in determining the correct a priori probability
distribution. The correct explanationist alternative to Bayes’s rule is
not a non-Bayesian updating or inference rule but, rather, an objective
form of Bayesianism in which explanation plays a central role. Ex-
ploring that role is an important task for future research on IBE and
Bayesianism.
nevin climenhaga
University of Notre Dame
43 Jonathan Weisberg, “Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework,” Synthese, clxvii, 1
(March 2009): 125–43.
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